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A CONSISTENT ALTERNATIVE VIEW WITHIN 
THE JUST WAR FAMILY 
John H. Yoder 
The most sensitive contemporary interpreters of the Just War Tradition (JWT) 
among Christian ethicists, like James Childress, I James Johnson,2 and David 
Hollenbach,3 are clear that in terms of moral typology the JWT is a subform of 
pacifism. Both the JWT and pacifism begin with a prima facie presumption 
against war. Both thereby reject the "realism" which exempts war from moral 
limits, and the "holy war" which gives it transcendent warrants. Pacifism denies 
that there are justified exceptions to that presumption,4 whereas the JWT holds 
that such exceptions can be identified by the use of a variety of discriminating 
criteria. 
I am then talking about pacifism and the warrants for it, when I test for internal 
coherence the set of arguments against the prima facie presumption. In so doing, 
one discovers that the JWT is a family of diverse views, not just one. That 
should be no surprise. Any multi-criteria moral system has to be open to variant 
lexical readings of how its varied considerations are weighted. More important 
is the discovery that the most important current mutant of the view is one which 
most interpreters have not labeled as such. That is the topic to which I propose 
that we should attend. 
The ethicist looking at the vast complexity of the just war tradition is struck 
first of all by the disparate styles of moral reasoning at work. Some of the criteria 
are procedural. Of these some are juridical: i.e., ideally they would admit of 
resolution through a court of law or a constitutional election. This applies in the 
ideal case to the criteria of just authority and of just cause. In other cases they 
are procedural without being juridical: e.g. the criterion of last resort. Another 
set of criteria are deontological. War must be fought within the rules established 
by international conventions. The definition of the rules is juridical, dictated by 
past diplomatic process written or unwritten, but the obligation to recognize 
them is deontological. The same applies to the most broad and most ill-defined 
of the classical criteria, namely that the means used must be "consonant with 
the rational nature of man." Classically this meant no lying, no rape or pillage, 
and no torture. These were principles to which no exception could be tolerated, 
although there might be difficult casuistic collisions in their definition. 
The immunity of the innocent at first is a deontological quality, but as the 
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tradition developed in its application to fortresses and guerrilla combat, this 
obligation became increasingly qualified by double effect considerations. 
Another set of categories refer to "intention." This covers a variety of kinds 
of reasoning. Sometimes (a) "intention" is used to refer to the responsibility 
which the agent in a justifiable war takes for seeking to bring about the ultimate 
state of things which will add up to the greatest good and the least evil. This is 
a careful consequentialism. In this sense it is under the heading of right intention 
that the sub-criterion of proportionality is applied. The sum total of foreseeable 
good and evil outcomes must be greater with the war than without it. Thus one 
meaning of "right intention" is thoroughly consequentialist. It lays itself open, 
as does all consequentialist reason, to debates about how well one can predict 
the outcomes of one's action, about how to weigh apples against tomatoes and 
potatoes and pomegranates (lives against freedoms, territory against honor, 
sovereignty against prosperity ... ), and about how responsible one is, in ajustifi-
cation based on calculated outcome, to factor in percentages of uncertainty and 
probabilities of backlash. 
At other times, "intention" has a more subjective or inward meaning. Then 
(b) it seeks to discriminate with some precision between what one knows will 
happen and the grounds on which one takes responsibility for particular decisions. 
Here we encounter the formidable complexity of the traditional discriminations 
of double effect, "doing evil to achieve good." Moral authenticity is then not 
out there in the world system, but in the willing of the agent, who may "intend" 
by his or her action something distinguishable from what he or she knows the 
deed is in actuality likely to bring about. 5 The action can be willed morally in 
a way that may disavow blame for the evil effects. At this point calculations of 
probability and proportionality arise again. 
Proportionality is one of the criteria of double effect reasoning. This is not 
because double effect reasoning itself is consequentialist in a global sense. Its 
very point is to be able morally to disavow some of the consequences which 
one is relatively sure are going to be entrained by one's decision. Proportionality 
is however still in the calculus on a second level, as a criterion for evaluating 
whether one's discriminating intention is honest, as over against merely saying 
that one does not "intend" the evil which comes as a side effect of the action 
one does for good reasons. To take one of the classical examples: if I crush a 
virus-bearing mosquito on my neighbor's head with my handkerchief or with a 
slap, it is clear that the pain and surprise I inflict upon him are less important 
than saving him from disease. If however "intending" to kill the mosquito I also 
kill my neighbor with a sledge hammer, the disproportion between the bad effects 
and the "intended" good effects will cast serious doubt on the honesty of my 
claim that the good effects were what I wanted. But the fact that this is well 
characterized as "casting a doubt on my honesty" indicates that the location of 
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the "intention" in question is within my will. The criterion of proportionality is 
not an ultimate consequentialism but a subordinate criterion of the authenticity 
of the intention which wills the good effect and is not disqualified by the bad 
effects. 
There are yet other criteria of "intention" (c) which are likewise subjective, 
but not subject to that kind of second order adjudication in the real world. In 
his classical passage, Thomas quotes Augustine as saying that even with proper 
cause and authority a war is morally disqualified if its motivation is hatred or 
the desire for personal vengeance or aggrandizement. 6 This too is called "inten-
tion. " 
To proceed still further down the list of traditional JW criteria would be 
necessary for completeness but is not essential for present purposes. What this 
superficial beginning has already shown is that the classical JWT is mixed in 
terms of types of moral reasoning. What it lists are not simply a few parallel 
guides for the testing of particular cases, all within one framework of moral 
reasoning, but rather a selection from across the span of various kinds of argument. 
The classical doctrine is not clear about the lexical ordering of these criteria. 
Neither are the contemporary theorists who are currently attempting to restore 
the validity ofthe tradition. It is not our present concern to argue this observation, 
either as a vice or as a virtue of the tradition. Classically it should be assumed 
it was a virtue. Moral discernment has many dimensions: should they not all be 
counted in an adequate casuistry? 
If multidimensionality is identified as a characteristic of the JWT, we are 
ready to recognize the originality of the view to which we now turn. Its peculiarity 
will be clearest if we contrast it with the mainstream tendency. 
The recent increase in articulate public concern about nuclear warfare accen-
tuates a triad of considerations regarding jus in bello: 
a. There is the criterion of proportionality, a quantitative measure, 
utilitarian in its style. A military action is wrong if it does more harm 
than the harm it prevents. 
b. There is the immunity of noncombatants: we tend to think about 
civilians in an enemy city, but it must apply as well to neutrals in 
nonbelligerent countries, to pilgrims and travelers, and even (according 
to the law) to soldiers who have surrendered or are not in active duty. 
This is a qualitative consideration, whose ancestry is deontological. An 
act of war is wrong if it destroys innocent life. More careful or more 
defensive definitions will of course add modifiers: the killing of the 
innocent must not be (1) directly (2) intended. 
c. Distinguishable from the above two criteria is a third: namely the 
ability to control or to discriminate. If a weapon's impact is indiscrimi-
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nate, then by definition its user cannot guarantee either proportionality 
or immunity. Thus discrimination is a procedurally prior condition of 
meeting the other two requirements. It thereby becomes a requisite in 
its own right. This has become visible in recent Vatican statements, 
where discrimination has itself been named as the requirement without 
pointing beyond it specifically to noncombatancy or proportionality. 
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This triad of logical requirements has been taken seriously by the four elder 
statesmen who recently proposed an American commitment to renounce the first 
strike. It is the prime consideration of Vatican documents and now of the United 
States bishops' Challenge of Peace. The attention given to this one set of in 
bello criteria is merited, because of their intrinsic clarity and their obvious 
application to the nuclear arms race. This has however led to broad neglect of 
all of the other criteria which the classical tradition also asked about. 
We tum now to a contrasting mood of moral reasoning about war, which by 
no means could be held to be without moral concern, but which wittingly and 
willingly sets aside that triad in favor of another set of measurements. This view, 
which pending clarification I propose to label by the names of its proponents, 
is the Orwell-Dulles argument. The readiness for "massive retaliation" which 
dominated American strategic thought, at least in the public arena, especially 
before the USSR approached nuclear parity, set aside globally and with a good 
conscience the classical criteria of proportionality and discrimination. If ever the 
button were to be pushed, the destruction inflicted by the US on Soviet targets, 
whether forces or cities, would intentionally be so much greater than any benefit 
the Soviets could be working toward that the exchange would be, in the under-
stated parlance of the time, "unacceptable." That it is intentionally dispropor-
tionate and probably intentionally indiscriminate is why it works so well to deter. 
After the development of a comparable Soviet arms system, we found that in 
a new key the same reasoning could still apply. Now the label was "mutually 
assured destruction" (MAD). Since this disproportionate and unacceptable level 
of probable cost from a nuclear exchange is what deters, each party has an 
interest in the other side's overwhelming second strike capability being credible, 
so that they know that we know that we can never afford to give occasion for 
their second strike power to be used. Second-order conclusions are then drawn 
from that. We taper off on civilian defense and ABM, to signal that we accept 
our second-strike vulnerability. If the degree of threatened overdestruction were 
decreased, the danger of the use of the bombs would be greater. It is this threat 
which current (198lff) talk of a "winnable" nuclear war now undercuts in a 
destabilizing way. 
What in the American nuclear policy of 1945-56 was articulated as "massive 
retaliation" was of course not a new idea. What was new, and what justifies our 
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using the name of John Foster Dulles, is that such a recourse is stated soberly, 
in moral terms, with no macho braggadocio, by a man who figured also as a 
churchman and a peacemaker. Apart from that, we should realistically recognize 
that similar reasoning processes were there before in the minds of less accountable 
spokespersons. Let one sample among many be the British admiral John 
Arbuthnot Fisher (1841-1920): 
The supremacy of the British navy is the best security for the peace of 
the world .... If you ntb it in, both at home and abroad, that you are 
ready for instant war, with every unit of your strength in the first line 
and waiting to be first in, and hit your enemy in the belly and kick him 
when he is down and boil your prisoners in oil (if you take any) and 
torture his women and children, then people will keep clear of you. ' 
George Orwell argued in a similar key though on other sides of the tradition, 
taking off from his polemic against those who in WW II were condemning 
obliteration bombing. Why keep non-combatant immunity as a near-sacred limit, 
he asked, when the other restraints are let go? Why respect restraints at all, if 
they only prolong a war, and thereby increase the cumulative quantity of destruc-
tion? The moral posturing of JW finickiness makes war worse by trying to make 
it respectable . 
. . . there is something very distasteful in accepting war as an instntment 
and at the same time wanting to dodge responsibility for its more obvi-
ously barbarous features. Pacifism is a tenable position, provided that 
you are willing to take the consequences. But all talk of "limiting" or 
"humanizing" war is sheer humbug, ... 
Why is it worse to kill civilians than soldiers? ... 
War is not avoidable at this stage of history, and since it has to happen 
it does not seem to me a bad thing that others should be killed besides 
young men ... the suffering of this war has been shared out more evenly 
than the last one was. The immunity of the civilian, one of the things 
that have made war possible, has been shattered .... I don't regret that. 
I can't feel that war is "humanized" by being confined to the slaughter 
of the young and becomes "barbarous" when the old get killed as well . 
. . .. War is of its nature barbarous, it is better to admit that. If we see 
ourselves as the savages we are, some improvement is possible, or at 
least thinkable .... 
I do object to the hypocrisy of accepting forces as an instrument while 
squealing against this or that individual weapon .... 8 
William V. O'Brien has long argued, as early as 1967,9 that the rest of the 
JWT can be preserved by abandoning the principle of non-combatant immunity. 
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Credible deterrence demands that there be no such restraint. Proportionality and 
the other criteria can still be respected. His careful redefinition is the smallest, 
yet sufficient component of the shift which Orwell and Dulles had made more 
massively. 
This view must certainly be taken account of in any typology of attitudes to 
the morality of war which intends to deal with the real world. Yet it is not 
identified, and even less made an object of serious dialogue, in the bulk of 
contemporary literature by our most expert colleagues. Some of the ethical moves 
it makes are illegitimate, when measured by the classical theory, but that is a 
petitionary observation, since the adequacy of the classical JWT is itself what 
is under question. Even those who claim that the classical JWT is capable of 
undergoing rehabilitation with a view to effective application grant that it has 
long not been applied effectively, whereas this view can claim decades of "suc-
cess" in averting nuclear war. 
This view is not a "holy war" view. It does correlate with a high view of the 
moral values being defended by one's own political system, so that for both the 
Soviet strategists and our own great risks are justified; but there is no desire to 
destroy the enemy as long as the ultimate shootout can be avoided. There is no 
claim that the enemy's infidel status demands his destruction or the subjection 
of his lands to our administration. The umbrella of MAD can even shelter the 
ephemeral detente of SALT and Helsinki. 
This view is not machiavellian, absolutist, or "realist." It is humane, morally 
accountable, humble in its awareness of the ambivalence of all simple answers, 
and concerned lest civilization be destroyed, not jingoist, chauvinist, or unself-
critical. In Orwell's use it is conscientious about other values; he rejects name 
calling and lying. As long as the disproportionate threats do succeed in mutual 
deterrence, they not only ward off the nuclear holocaust which they menace the 
enemy with; they may even impose some limits on the degree to which conven-
tional wars are permitted to escalate. To the extent to which local wars in 
Indochina, the Middle East, southern Africa, or the Persian Gulf are dependent 
for their escalation upon superpower supply lines, the ultimate fear may motivate 
the superpowers to discipline such escalation. Certainly such ultimate fear was 
part of the reason for the decision of President Eisenhower not to intervene for 
the defense of free Hungary in 1956, whereby the other pillar of Secretary Dulles' 
announced policy, the rolling back of the Iron Curtain, was tacitly abandoned. 
So we have to recognize a new logical type demanding recognition as such. 
If we call it a variant of the JWT, then it must be seen to be as different from 
the classical multivalent form as is the holy war. 
Now we can proceed to a formal description of the Fisher-Orwell-Dulles 
position. It is a fair characterization to say that this position is consistently 
consequentialist. It gives to "peace" a very great value. It gives to the maintenance 
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of a tolerable balance within the present world political order a greater value 
than to any profound change within sections of the system or the total system. 
Once "peace" is so defined, then a wager in which enormous threats keep that 
"peace" from being shaken is a wise wager, as long as the probability of preventing 
the worst seems to the experts to be high. That it "works" is proven by the way 
in which the generation of the active involvement of Admiral Fisher the British 
control of the seas did actually exclude any world conflagration. It is demonstrated 
again by the way in which the nuclear balance of terror claims to have successfully 
kept world "peace" for the last generation. It is demonstrated in the way in which 
the network of "National Security" states have held the lid on domestic change 
in South America since the fall of Allende. The condition of its working is the 
credibility of the threat of utterly disproportionate retaliation. Meeting this 
requirement includes both technical questions such as whether our weapons are 
really that strong, and psychological questions such as whether we are really 
ready to use them, or the more refined question of whether we can convince the 
Russians that we are ready to use them. All of this is thoroughly consequential. 
What it would take to refute it in its own terms is clear. That it is deeply different 
from the classical JWT is clear. Asking what it would take to refute it on 
systematic grounds sends us back to the classic ethical debates about the limits 
of utilitarian reasoning, and therefore is not specifically a debate about the just 
war. 
Within its own terms this view has a strong case. By abandoning the unman-
ageable mixture of styles, it promises to shorten war once it has begun, by not 
being finicky about means, and to prevent all-out nuclear war completely by 
effective disproportionate threats. 
All that it sins against is the deontological immunity of the innocent; but one 
can argue that that value had already become vestigial under the impact of 
double-effect reasoning. To put it another way: in the mix of logics, the multi-
valent JWT has long been the terrain of a losing battle, with deontological and 
juridical styles losing ground before consequentialist and national-sovereignty 
pressures. Orwell's defense of obliteration bombing (more consistent than 
Michael Walzer's effort to explain it within JW categories by inventing a new 
but undefinable limiting concept of "supreme emergency"lO) rounds off that 
victory of consequential reason for WW II and opens the door for Dulles. 
Though they are the same with respect to what I am discussing (disregard for 
the triad of discrimination, proportion, and immunity) Orwell and Dulles differed 
in one way. With Dulles the threat successfully deters; it is possible to bluff (or, 
as a part of negotiation, to delay striking). The disproportionate damage is never 
actually inflicted. With Orwell, one actually fights indiscriminately in order to 
minimize total disutility. The Orwellian approval of city bombing in WW II 
could be carried out without destroying the world; MAD cannot. Is this a differ-
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ence of kind or only of scale? Or of timing? 
A sincere user of the Fisher/Orwell/Dulles view needs to defend it against the 
classical JW view (as Orwell was doing in the text I read). Likewise the JW 
view, if any restraints are to continue to exist, derived from proportionality and 
noncombatant immunity, without being whittled down to insignificance by double 
effect and supreme emergency, needs to argue against Orwell/Dulles. The 
'realist" or the pacifist cannot argue against both at once, for they differ. The 
difference between them matters more for national policy than does their common 
rejection of pacifism, of "realism," or of the crusade. Yet there has been little 
such debate. Since John Kenneth Ryan in the 1930'SII and John Ford in the 
1940's,12 people trying to resuscitate the JWT have been arguing that the notion 
of the noncombatant has not become meaningless. Some Vatican documents 
have put the whole weight of their rejection of nuclear weapons on the ground 
that it is in principle indiscriminate or disproportionate. But none seem to have 
argued openly, in the awareness that it is an argument between ethical systems 
and therefore calls for other than petitionary proofs, why proportion is always 
necessary, if in fact a wildly disproportionate threat will keep the peace. Nor 
has it been argued why noncombatants ought to be spared, if by being less 
careful about them one would win the war with less total death and destruction 
(especially since, with considerations of double effect, fortress theory, and 
supreme emergency, their immunity was already far gone). 
If this is the lay of the land, just war discriminators and utilitarian deterrers 
should debate more with each other rather than ganging up on the pacifists. (The 
pacifist agrees with the JWT that indiscriminate consequentialism is wrong, and 
agrees with Orwell that the JW discriminator's scruples are ineffective.) The 
recently broadened nuclear debate boils down to this: utilitarian deterrence vs. 
classical JWT discrimination. 
As far as a third pa11y observer can say, the argument could logically go either 
way. Orwell might be able to argue effectively that the classical multi-logic JWT 
was always a confusion in principle, and boiling it down to an honest consequen-
tialism updates its essence faithfully. An anti-Dulles JW advocate would need 
in return as never before to clarify what the non-negotiable non-consequentialist 
elements in the tradition still are, and how to make them work. Either way we 
should gain in clarity. 
University of Notre Dame 
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